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RiCHARD  J.  LAzARus*
Since my Garrison lecture three years  ago, the Court has re-
mained remarkably constant in at least one significant respect: Its
membership.  Justice Breyer remains today, as he was three years
ago, the most junior Justice.  Political scientists dub a court made
up of the same judges over time as a "natural court."  Because Jus-
tice  Breyer joined  the  Court in  1994,  that means  the  Supreme
Court  has been  a "natural  court"  for eight  years  and counting.
While  that might  not  seem like  along time  to some,  for the  Su-
preme Court that is a very long time.  Indeed, it is the second long-
est  time in  the  Court's  history.  Between  1811  and  1823,  when
there  were  only  seven  Justices  on  the  Court,  there  were  no
changes  in  membership.  Only  on  two  other  occasions  has  the
Court gone for as long as six years.'
The  significance  for environmental  law is considerable.  This
is a Court with an affirmative agenda.  It  is not a passive Court.
The Justices have discrete areas of law that they are interested in
shaping  and, because  the Justices  know  each other so well,  they
are better able to maintain the stable majority necessary for such
a shaping to be  accomplished.  They, accordingly,  systematically
grant review  and  decide cases that present the relevant legal is-
sues in settings favorable  to the outcome that the majority seeks
to promote.  When,  moreover,  the Court is so  capable  of sending
out such clear signals, it is far more likely that sympathetic insti-
tutional litigants  and lower court judges can effectively  serve up
to the Court cases that are attractive vehicles  for lawmaking.
The upshot has been  a Court  able to issue  a series of major
related  rulings  in  relatively  short  order.  The  gradual  incre-
mentalism that is supposedly structurally built into judicial deci-
*  Professor  of Law, Georgetown  University  Law Center.  Thanks  are owed  to
Carrie  Jenks,  Georgetown  University  Law  Center  2003,  who  provided  outstanding
research assistance in the preparation  of this article.
1.  See  Supreme  Court  Historical  Society,  Presidential  nominees,  available at
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/fp/courtlist.htm;  see also THE  OXFORD  COMPAN-
ION  TO  THE  SUPREME  COURT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  (Kermit Hall, ed.  1992).
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sion-making  is  in short  supply these  days.  The  opportunity  for
conflict with the other branches of government  is correspondingly
increased.  Deprived of a meaningful opportunity to reshape their
own lawmaking efforts in response to the Court's rapidly evolving
jurisprudence,  the  legislative  and  executive  branches  more  fre-
quently find themselves  out of step with the Court.  Once  out  of
step, the lawmaking efforts of the other branches are more suscep-
tible  to legal challenge.  That is  also why the current Court, not-
withstanding  its "conservative" views,  seems especially  ready  to
overturn the decisions of other branches within the federal system
and of state sovereigns.2  In short, the stability within the Court is
the source  of some  instability in its  dealings  with other parts  of
the government.
The Court's resurgent activism has been and portends to con-
tinue to  be highly  relevant to environmental  law because  of the
way that environmental  law interacts with those areas of law on
the  Court's front burner.  Environmental  law,  largely because  of
the nature  of the ecological  problem that it  seeks  to address,  de-
pends upon certain institutional relationships between competing
lawmaking  authorities both  within branches  of government  and
between competing sovereigns.  Environmental  law expresses cer-
tain  values  and  priorities  that  raise  conflicts  with other  values
and priorities, including some of a constitutional dimension. Wheth-
er by happenstance  or design, much of the  Supreme Court's  cur-
rent agenda  seems  disproportionately ready to unsettle those in-
stitutional relationships  and the  hierarchy of values  upon which
modern  environmental  law has  depended since  1970.
In my Garrison Lecture three years ago, I surveyed the envi-
ronmental law decisions  of the Supreme Court between  1970 and
1999.  I commented on which Justices had been more or less influ-
ential  in  shaping the  Court's decisions  and, even more  provoca-
tively (if not foolishly), sought to "score" the individual Justices on
their responsiveness  to  environmental  protection  concerns  based
on their votes cast in a subset of those cases.3  The broader thesis
2.  See, e.g.,  Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court 1998 Term Foreword: The New
Constitutional Order and the Chastening  of Constitutional  Aspiration, 113  HARv.  L.
REV.  29  (1999);  Larry D. Kramer,  The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword:  We  the
Court, 115 HnAv.  L. REV.  4 (2001); Linda Greenhouse, The High Court's Target: Con-
gress, N.Y.  TIMEs,  Feb.  25,  2001 § 4 at 3.
3.  Richard J. Lazarus,  Thirty Years of Environmental Protection  Law in the Su-
preme Court, 17  PACE  ENvTL.  L.  REV.  1 (1999).  The Garrison lecture  was my initial
analysis and publication.  I subsequently published a fuller description  of the results
of my survey of the Justices in Richard J.  Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental
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of the lecture, however, was that there is  something distinctively
"environmental" about environmental law and that the Court's in-
creasing  inability  to  appreciate  that  dimension  was  leading  to
more poorly-reasoned  decisions and results.
Pace has now provided me with the luxury to revisit my ear-
lier conclusions with the benefit of three additional years of hind-
sight.  To  that end, this  update  addresses  three  topics.  First, it
considers whether  the opinion assignments  and votes  of individ-
ual Justices during the past three years either reinforce or under-
mine my prior assessment.  Second, the update surveys  the most
significant  environmental  law  decisions  of the  past three  years
and considers their portent for the possible restoration of what is
"environmental"  about  environmental  law  in  the  Court.  Third
and finally, the update identifies important legal issues now loom-
ing before  the Court.4
I.  Reexamining  the Environmental Scorecard  of the
Justices
The only completed Supreme Court Terms since my 1999 Gar-
rison Lecture are the October Terms 1999 and 2000.  Although the
current Term is now more than halfway completed, there are not
yet any decided environmental law cases.  As it happens, there are
almost no such cases on the docket this Term.  The only exception
is Tahoe-Sierra  Preservation  Council v.  Tahoe Regional Planning
Commission,5  the  latest  in  a  seemingly  never-ending  series  of
regulatory takings  challenges  to environmental  land use restric-
tions.
6
During the last two Terms, however, the Court decided twelve
additional  cases  arising  in  an  environmental  law  context,  as
broadly described in my 1999 Lecture.  As in the past, these cases
include classic public land law controversies, pollution control con-
flicts, original actions raising border  and interstate water alloca-
About Environmental  Law, 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV.  703 (2000).  A fuller description of the
numerical  analysis  underlying  my  Garrison  lecture  is  set  forth  in  that  separate
publication.
4.  528 U.S. 167  (1999).
5.  No.  00-1167 (U.S. argued Jan. 7,  2002).  The court has decided this case since
this article first went to press. See note 77, infra.
6.  E.g., Suitum v.  Tahoe  Regional  Planning Agency, 520  U.S.  725 (U.S.  1997);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S.  1003 (1991);  Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483  U.S. 825 (1987);
First English Evangelical  Lutheran  Church v. County  of Los Angeles,  482 U.S.  304
(1987);  Agins v. City of Tiburon,  447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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tion disputes.  They also include many cases that raise legal issues
for which the environmental setting would seem wholly incidental
to the resolution  of the precise  legal issue before the Court.7
The leading  opinion  writer for the Court  in the  past survey
was Justice White by a large margin.  During the past three years,
the opinion writing is far more evenly divided.  Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg lead the pack, each writing three out of the twelve cases,
with  Justices  Kennedy  and  Souter responsible  for  two opinions
each.  The small number of cases plainly limits the significance of
any of these numbers.8
Justice  Kennedy  continued  his  remarkable  feat  of  almost
never dissenting in an environmental  law  case before  the Court.
In my earlier  survey, Justice Kennedy was, aside from one inter-
state water allocation dispute and a few qualified concurring opin-
ions,  in  the  majority  in  virtually  all  fifty-seven  of  the
environmental cases in which he had participated.  For the twelve
new  cases,  Kennedy kept  his record  fairly  intact.  He  dissented
only once,  in Idaho v.  United States,9 which raised  a dispute be-
tween the federal and state governments  regarding ownership  of
certain  submerged  lands.  Still, as  before,  no  single  Justice  dis-
sents  from  the  majority  very  often  in  the  environmental  cases.
The lowest percentage for a Justice being in the majority was still
well above seventy percent.10
The final category, the "environmental protection" (EP) scores
of the Justices, is  also intriguing.  In the last survey, I described
several  prominent  examples  in  which  individual  Justices  voted
quite  differently  than  one might  expect.  So-called  "liberal" Jus-
tices voted for positions denounced by environmentalists, and Jus-
tices whom  environmentalists  presume  are hostile  to their legal
positions in fact voted in their favor.  I also explained some of the
reasons for that phenomena  and why its occurrence  is not at all
paradoxical, but rather to be expected.  Indeed, that is why it was
so striking that Justice Douglas maintained an EP score of 100 in
favor  of environmental  protection.  No  matter what  the legal is-
sue,  no matter what the context, the Justice always  managed  to
cast a vote in favor of the position supported by environmentalists.
For that same  reason,  it  is interesting that each of the Jus-
tices popularly  aligned with the liberal side of the Court consist-
7.  A full listing of the cases is included in Appendix A, infra.
8.  See Appendix A, infra.
9.  533 U.S. 262 (2000).
10.  See Appendix A, infra.
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ently voted in favor of the position supported by environmentalists
during the past several years.  As in  1999, for the purposes of this
inquiry, I have identified a subset of cases for which the environ-
mental  context  was  more  than  wholly  incidental  to  the  issue
before  the Court.  I have included six cases:  Friends of the Earth
v.  Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,  (Clean Water Act envi-
ronmental  citizen  suit standing),1  Public Lands Council v.  Bab-
bitt (Department of the Interior Taylor Grazing Act regulations),12
Solid Waste Agency  of Northern Cook County v.  U.S. Army  Corps
of Engineers (Clean  Water  Act jurisdiction  over  "isolated" wa-
ters),13  Whitman  v.  American Trucking Association (nondelega-
tion  doctrine  challenge  to  Clean Air  Act),' 4  American Trucking
Association v.  Whitman (relevance of costs in promulgation  of na-
tional  ambient air quality standards  under the Clean Air Act),15
and Palazzolo v.  Rhode Island (regulatory  takings  challenge  to
state wetlands protection law). 16  Justices  Stevens,  Souter, Gins-
burg, and  Breyer cast  all of their votes in these six cases in sup-
port of the environmentalist  position.
By contrast, the conservative members  of the Court were not
nearly so one-sided.  Justices Thomas  and Scalia voted in favor of
the environmentalist-favored  position in three out of the six cases;
and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices  O'Connor and Kennedy
did  so  in four out of the six  cases.  The  lowest EP score  for any
Justice, accordingly, was a fifty, which was far higher than their
previous  scores,  albeit  based  on  an  even  smaller  sample  than
before.
17
Justice Scalia, moreover,  authored the Court's opinion in the
two cases that handed environmentalists  and federal  regulators
their single  biggest win  in the  Supreme  Court in  decades.  The
Court granted review in the two American Trucking Clean Air Act
cases  separately,  had  separate  briefings  in  the  two  cases,  and
scheduled them for back-to-back separate oral arguments.  Justice
Scalia  authored the  single unanimous  opinion  for the  Court dis-
posing of both cases.  As further elaborated in the next part of this
update,  there  was  nothing  remotely  grudging  or  limited  in the
Court's  opinion.  Scalia's  opinion  for  the  Court  constitutes  a
11.  528 U.S. 167  (2000).
12.  529 U.S.  728 (2000).
13.  531  U.S. 159  (2001).
14.  531 U.S. 457 (2001).
15.  Id.
16.  533 U.S. 606 (2001).
17.  See Appendix B,  infra.
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sweeping  and categorical  rejection  of the regulated  community's
position on all the legal issues before the Court,  or at least, per-
haps more fairly described,  of the D.C. Circuit's strained effort  to
revitalize the nondelegation  doctrine.
II.  The Court's Recent Rulings  and Their Portent for
Environmental Law
What is clear at the outset is that the October 1999 and Octo-
ber 2000 Supreme  Court Terms included  several  exceedingly im-
portant environmental rulings.  What is less clear is their portent
for the future of environmental  law.  The four cases are Friends  of
the Earth  v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.,18 the compan-
ion cases Whitman v. American Trucking Association19 and Ameri-
can Trucking Association v.  Whitman,20  and Palazzolo v.  Rhode
Island.
21
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw was  a significant victory for
the environmental  community.  Immediately prior to that ruling,
the discernable trajectory of the Court's standing decisions was to
make  it  increasingly  difficult  for  environmentalists  to maintain
citizen  suit  enforcement  actions.  As  described  in  my  1999  Lec-
ture,  the Court's  opinions  in Lujan v.  National Wildlife Federa-
tion22 and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,23 in particular, promoted
a  view  of standing  requirements  that  systematically  disadvan-
taged citizen suits.  The inherent temporal  and spatial uncertain-
ties associated with ecological  cause  and  effect  coupled  with the
fragmentation  of  decision-making  authority  that  exists  both
within government and the regulated community in environmen-
tal law seemed poised  to render the Court's heightened  standing
requirements  of  injury,  causation,  and  redressability  virtually
insurmountable.
Justice  Ginsburg's  opinion  for  the  Court  in  Laidlaw,  by
contrast, responds to those very same concerns and reaffirms the
ability  of environmental  plaintiffs  to  demonstrate  standing  not-
withstanding the inevitable  uncertainties  in their allegations  of
fact in support of standing.  The Court agreed that the plaintiffs in
an environmental  citizen  suit need not allege and prove that the
18.  528 U.S.  167.
19.  531  U.S. 457.
20.  Id.
21.  533 U.S.  606.
22.  497  U.S. 871 (1990).
23.  504 U.S.  555 (1992).
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pollution will in fact harm the environment in a particular  way.
The plaintiffs need only show injury to themselves, which can be
satisfied "when they aver that they use the affected  area and are
persons  'for  whom  the  aesthetic  and  recreational  values  of the
area will be lessened."' 24  The  Court further agreed that standing
is  not defeated  by the  fact that  any  civil  penalties  obtained  are
payable to the United States Treasury and not to the citizen plain-
tiffs themselves.  The Court reasoned that civil penalties provide
"redress to citizen plaintiffs ...  [t] o the extent that they encourage
defendants  to discontinue  current violations and deter them from
committing future ones."25
The  two American Trucking Clean  Air Act rulings  likewise
constituted  major  victories  for  environmentalists  and  environ-
mental regulators.  Together, they rebuffed  legal arguments that
challenged two of modern environmental law's most basic precepts.
The nondelegation case, brought to the Court by the Solicitor Gen-
eral,  questioned  the very  ability  of the  national  government  to
construct an institutional framework  for environmental  lawmak-
ing.  Here too, as with the law of standing, the nature of the prob-
lem environmental law seeks to address generates certain hurdles
for the lawmaking process.  Of relevance to the nondelegation  doc-
trine, the development of environmental standards necessarily de-
pends on broad delegations of lawmaking  authority to regulatory
agencies.  It  also  requires  the  agency  to  promulgate  standards
that  are  simultaneously  enormously  controversial,  because  of
their distributional implications, and riddled with scientific uncer-
tainty  and  technical  complexity  that  undermine  their  trans-
parency.  In short, federal environmental law depends  on the very
kind  of lawmaking framework  that cannot  be  squared  with the
strict view of the nondelegation doctrine promoted by the D.C. Cir-
cuit and the regulated  community in American Trucking.26
For that same  reason,  the Court's  sweeping  rejection  of the
D.C.  Circuit's  effort  to  resurrect  a reinvigorated  nondelegation
doctrine was essential to the maintenance of modern environmen-
tal law.  The Court's ruling on the nondelegation issue was, more-
over, unanimous.  Even the Chief Justice, whose earlier opinion in
24.  Laidlaw, 528 U.S.  at  183 (quoting  Sierra Club v.  Morton, 405 U.S.  727,  735
(1972)).
25.  Id.  at 203.
26.  American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. E.P.A.,  175  F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) opin-
ion modified on rehearing  by  195  F.3d 4 (D.C.  Cir. 1999).
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the  Benzene  case had  indicated  support for closer nondelegation
doctrine scrutiny,27 joined the Court's ruling, without elaboration.
The Court also unanimously maintained the status quo in the
companion  case  of American Trucking Association v.  Whitman,
upholding  EPA's  longstanding  position  that  the  Clean  Air  Act
does not  allow the Agency  to consider  compliance  costs in estab-
lishing  national  ambient  air  quality  standards  (NAAQS)  under
the Act.28  Here too writing for the  Court, Justice  Scalia did  far
more than just decline  to embrace  industry's  proffered  canon  of
statutory construction  under which agencies could presumptively
consider  compliance  costs in environmental  standard setting un-
less Congress expressly and specifically provided otherwise. 29  The
Court  effectively  endorsed  the converse  position  at least for the
purposes  of promulgating NAAQS  under the Clean Air Act.  The
Court reasoned that the factor of compliance  costs "is both so indi-
rectly related to public health and so full of potential for canceling
the  conclusions  drawn  from  direct  health  effects  that  it  would
surely  have  been  expressly  mentioned  in Sections  108  and  109
had Congress meant it to be considered."30  For that same reason,
Justice  Breyer's strained effort in his separate concurrence  to re-
habilitate  costs  as part  of the  public  health  inquiry  ultimately
falls flat.
31
Notwithstanding the Court's rulings in Laidlaw and the two
American Trucking cases, the warnings  about the Supreme Court
that Professor Oliver Houck delivered in his own Garrison Lecture
about environmental  law's  future  remain apt  today. 3 2  No  doubt
the Court's most foreboding ruling was its decision in Solid Waste
Agency  of Northern Cook  County  v.  U.S. Army  Corps of Engi-
neers33  (SWANCC) in 2001.  By a five to four vote, the Court not
only struck down the so-called "Migratory Bird Rule,"34 but went
on  to  hold  that the  Clean  Water  Act's  definition  of "navigable
waters"35  does  not  extend  to  "nonnavigable,  isolated,  intrastate
27.  Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum  Inst. v. OSHA, 448 U.S.  607,
671  (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
28.  531 U.S. at 469.
29.  Brief Amicus  Curiae  of the  General  Electric  Co.  in  Support  of Cross-Peti-
tioner, at 7, American Trucking Ass'n v. Whitman, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (No. 99-1257).
30.  American Trucking, 531  U.S. at 469  (emphasis in original).
31.  Id.  at 491 (Breyer, J., concurring).
32.  Oliver Houck, Second Annual Lloyd K  Garrison Lecture on Environmental
Law: Environmental Law and the General Welfare,  16 PACE  ENVTL.  L REV.  1 (1998).
33.  531 U.S.  159  (2001).
34.  Id.  at 170.
35.  See 33  U.S.C.  § 1251 (2002).
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waters."36  Because,  moreover,  "navigable waters" is the jurisdic-
tional touchstone for the entire Act,  not just for the Section  404
program, the Court's  ruling  is  equally  applicable  to  the  Section
402  National  Pollutant  Discharge  Elimination  System  permit
program.
37
The significance  of the Court's ruling is also not confined  to
the meaning of the Clean Water Act.  The majority explained that
it would have declined to defer to the Army Corps' statutory inter-
pretation even in the absence  of "plain meaning" because  of the
'serious  constitutional  problems'  that would have  been raised by
the broader  construction  of the  Act's jurisdictional  scope.38  Ac-
cording to the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court, there are "sig-
nificant constitutional  and federalism issues" concerning whether
Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause 39 to regu-
late dredge  and fill  activities in such isolated waters.40  "Permit-
ting  respondents  to  claim  federal  jurisdiction  over  ponds  and
mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird Rule'41 would result in
a significant  impingement  of the  States' traditional  and primary
power over land and water use."42
What is  most striking  about  the result  in SWANCC  is that
until relatively  recently, one  could have  safely  assumed that the
federal  government  would  have  easily  prevailed  on both  of the
questions  presented.  In  United  States  v.  Riverside  Bayview
Homes, Inc.  ,43  to be sure, the Court expressly declined to address
the  precise  issue  of  statutory  construction  before  the  Court  in
SWANCC.44  The  essential  rationale  of Riverside Bayview, how-
ever, especially  as  it  relates  to longstanding  administrative  con-
struction, legislative ratification,  and  statutory objectives,  is the
same for both cases.  The Court in Riverside Bayview had already
overcome  the most  difficult hurdle  in construing "navigable  wa-
ters," which  was to  uphold  the notion that  it  extends  to  waters
that are themselves  not navigable  and  are instead  a seasonally
varying mixture of land and water.45
36.  SWANCC,  531 U.S. at 171-72.
37.  See 33  U.S.C.  § 1342  (2002).
38.  SWANCC,  531 U.S. at 173.
39.  U.S.  CONST.  art. I, § 8, cl.  3.
40.  SWANCC,  531 U.S. at 174.
41.  51  Fed. Reg. 41,  217  (Nov.  13,  1986).
42.  SWANCC,  531 U.S. at 174.
43.  474 U.S.  121  (1985).
44.  Id. at  131-32  n.8.
45.  Id. at  138.
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Even more remarkable,  however, was the Court's characteri-
zation of the Commerce  Clause issue as problematic.  To be sure,
the "Migratory Bird Rule's" focus on whether certain birds crossed
interstate borders  does not even remotely reflect the relevant fac-
tors for  determining  Commerce  Clause jurisdiction.  It certainly
did not after United States v. Lopez,46 but also likely did not even
do so before Lopez.  The infirmities  of the "Migratory Bird Rule,"
however,  simply  reflect  the  fact  that  the  Rule  asks  the  wrong
question.  It  does  not  mean  that if one  asks  the right question,
Commerce  Clause jurisdiction does  not exist for the very kind  of
federal  regulation  at  issue  in  SWANCC.  Quite  the  opposite  is
true.  Properly framed, federal regulation of either dredge and fill
activities  or  discharges  of pollutants  into  waters  of the United
States,  no  matter how  broadly  defined,  is  well within  Congres-
sional Commerce Clause authority both before  and after Lopez.
The essentially economic  nature of both the regulated  activi-
ties themselves  as well  as  their impacts  fit well within a classic
notion of regulation  of activities that "substantially affect" inter-
state  commerce.  The  precise  environmental  media-air,  land,
water-is not determinative of the economic character or substan-
tiality of either the activity or the impact.  In SWANCC, for exam-
ple,  the  activity  involved  the  construction  of  a  large  landfill
facility, which is itself a commercial  undertaking  as  are the nu-
merous waste collection  activities intimately  associated with the
landfill.47  In addition, in SWANCC, the proposed landfill, by de-
stroying habitat upon which  substantial populations of migratory
birds depended, would directly affect the multi-million dollar tour-
ism and recreational industry that depends  on maintenance  and
protection of such bird populations.48
The Court's constitutional problem with the Clean Water Act
is not, at bottom, based  on the notion that Congress could not in
fact regulate the very activities at issue in SWANCC.  It is instead
based  on  the  very  different  problem  that  the  "Migratory  Bird
Rule," and perhaps even the Act's current statutory structure and
jurisdictional  touchstone  fail  to  reflect  the  Court's  newly  con-
structed  framework  for  Commerce  Clause analysis  post Lopez,49
46.  514 U.S. 549  (1995).
47.  Respondents' Brief at 43-47, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (No.
99-1178).
48.  Id.  at 47-49.
49.  514  U.S. 549  (1995).
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and  United States v.  Morrison. 50  Instead,  the Clean  Water Act,
like most of the other comprehensive  federal environmental  laws
that Congress  first enacted  in the  1970s,  pays little attention  to
Commerce  Clause concerns in the first instance.  These laws  are,
as Professor Oliver Houck described in his own Garrison Lecture,
sub silentio premised  on expansive notions of Congressional power
under the General Welfare  Clause.51
Environmental laws inevitably regulate and affect commerce
because  the nation's natural  resources  literally  supply, after all,
the basic ingredients of commercial life.  But that is not to say that
the objectives  of those laws are commercial or that their commer-
cial  character  is  the reason  the laws  regulate  certain  activities.
What frequently makes environmental laws so historically unique
and important is that they promote  a different vision of the rela-
tionship between humankind and the natural environment, which
is deliberately not commercial  in its emphasis.
Hence,  even  assuming that Congress  could  theoretically  re-
write all  of the current federal  environmental  laws  in a manner
wholly  compatible  with  the  Court's  current  Commerce  Clause
analysis,  without  any jurisdictional  loss,  the  fact  remains  that
there is an analytical gap between the Court's precedent and the
existing statutes.  It  would, moreover,  be  no easy  task simply to
reenact existing laws in a manner more harmonious with the new
judicial precedent.  It  is far more difficult under our system of law-
making to  enact  statutes than  it  is  to  prevent  their enactment.
And, that would be especially  so in the environmental arena, now
that the substantiality of the cost implications of various statutory
schemes are better understood then they were at the time of their
original enactment.  In the aftermath  of SWANCC,  for example,
the legislative hurdles are high and wide to now amend the Clean
Water Act to recapture the more expansive meaning of "navigable
waters" and "waters of the United States" rejected by the Court in
SWANCC.
Until SWANCC, the threat posed to existing federal environ-
mental laws was only theoretical.  The origins of the Court's revi-
siting of its  Commerce  Clause  analysis  were  primarily  derived
from  the Court's understandable  concern  with Congress's  never-
ceasing proclivity to expand the federal criminal jurisdiction of the
50.  529 U.S.  598 (2000).
51.  Houck, supra note 32, at 13;  U.S.  CONST. art I,  § 8, cl.  1.
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federal judiciary.52  Neither of the laws  struck  down in Lopez  or
Morrison involved  matters that readily lent themselves  to  state
regulation  in  the  absence  of an  overarching  federal  framework.
Environmental  protection  requirements,  by contrast,  have  been
highly dependent  on the  existence  of just such a  comprehensive
federal administrative framework even when that framework ulti-
mately seeks state and local implementation  efforts.
Finally, the Court has  decided yet another significant regula-
tory takings claim, Palazzolo v.  Rhode Island,53 since I presented
my Garrison Lecture.  The Palazzolo results were far more mixed
for both property rights  advocates  and governmental  regulators.
For each, there were parts of the opinion to be applauded, yet also
other parts that should raise substantial concerns.
At issue in Palazzolo were two different  kinds of per se tak-
ings tests, one favored by developers and the other by government
regulators.  The first concerns the relevance to the regulatory tak-
ings inquiry when a landowner acquires the property after the re-
striction  being challenged  is in place.  In Palazzolo, 54 the  Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that such pre-acquisition  notice is an
absolute defense to a takings claim whether brought under Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council55 or Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v.  City of  NewYork. 56  This so-called "notice rule" amounts
to a per se "no takings" test.
The  second  concerns  the  degree  of deprivation  required  to
trigger  a  finding  that  a  land  use  restriction  is  a per se  taking
under Lucas. In Lucas, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a Lucas
per se taking required a threshold finding that the landowner had
been  deprived  of all  economic  value  or use.57  Palazzolo  argued
before  the  Supreme  Court in favor  of an expansion  of Lucas in
which a landowner's loss would be measured by the amount of use
or  value  allegedly  lost  by  the  restriction  rather  than  by  the
amount of use or value remaining.58  Palazzolo further argued for
an expansion  of Lucas under which  a  court would consider  only
52.  See Sara Sun Beale,  The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun Penal-
ties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal  Prosecutors,  51 DuKE
L.J.  1641  (2002).
53.  533 U.S.  606 (2001).
54.  746 A.2d  707 (R.I. 2000).
55.  505 U.S.  1003  (1992).
56.  438 U.S.  104  (1978)
57.  505 U.S. at 1015.
58.  533 U.S. at 623.
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the restricted portion  of the land in  deciding whether  a depriva-
tion of all economic value or use had occurred.
The Court rejected both the per se no takings test at least as
applied in Palazzolo, and Mr. Palazzolo's  request  that it  expand
the potential applicability of the Lucas per se takings test.59  With
respect  to the former, the Court reasoned that "[tihe  State may
not put so  potent a Hobbesian  stick into the Lockean  Bundle."60
"It would be illogical, and unfair, to bar a regulatory takings claim
because  of the post-enactment  transfer  of ownership  where  the
steps necessary  to  make  the claim  were not  taken, or could  not
have been taken, by a previous  owner."61
In likewise  rejecting the landowner's  competing per se test,
the Court substantially limited the Lucas per se rule by reaffirm-
ing the extreme nature of the regulatory impact needed for its ap-
plication.  The Court held that "permitting a landowner to build a
substantial residence on an 18-acre parcel does not leave the prop-
erty  'economically  idle."' 62  The  Court rejected  Palazzolo's  claim
that a Lucas per se taking may be triggered by a substantial re-
duction  in  value  alone,  regardless  of the  amount  of remaining
value in the property.
63
Palazzolo suggests  the  demise  of per se takings  analysis  in
favor  of  the  kind  of balancing  approached  favored  by  Justice
O'Connor and seemingly favored  by Justice Kennedy.  Ever since
Justice White departed from the Court in 1993,  it has been clear
that Justice  Scalia's  then-recent  opinion  for the  Court in Lucas
had lost its majority, meaning that the Court was likely to apply
Lucas only narrowly  in future cases.  Justice  White supplied  the
fifth vote in Lucas and Justice Kennedy, remarkably, joined only
the Court's judgment and wrote  separately.
As described in my original Garrison Lecture, Kennedy's  con-
curring  opinion in Lucas embraced  a  legal  analysis that is very
different than that advanced by the majority.  He made plain his
view  that  total  economic  deprivation  is  not  enough,  standing
alone, to justify a per  se approach.  It  is also relevant "whether the
deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed  expecta-
tions."64  Kennedy  also  rejected  suggestions  that  the  kinds  of
59.  Id. at 631.
60.  Id. at 627.
61.  Id. at 628
62.  Id. at 631.
63.  Palazzolo, 533  U.S. at 616.
64.  Lucas, 505 U.S.  at 1034.
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"background"  legal  principles  that  could  justify  a  complete  eco-
nomic deprivation  must reflect some static common law.  In Ken-
nedy's "view, reasonable expectations  must be understood in light
of the whole of our legal tradition.  The common law of nuisance is
too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a com-
plex and interdependent  society."6 5
In Palazzolo, Justice Kennedy's writing for the Court finally
realized that expectation by narrowly construing Lucas in several
significant respects.  His opinion for the Court narrowly construed
the economic deprivation trigger necessary for a Lucas per se tak-
ing.  His opinion purported not to reach the content of the "back-
ground  principles"  that  provide  an  exception  to  a  Lucas per se
taking, but nonetheless  described  those principles  in terms that
make clear that they are not strictly confined to centuries-old com-
mon law doctrine.  In particular, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the
Court repeatedly presumes that legislation or regulation may be a
background  principle,  suggesting  that  the  only  question  is  not
whether they may  be, but the  "precise circumstances"  of "when"
they are.66  Perhaps  even more  significantly,  Justice  Kennedy's
opinion  for the  Court  supports  the  contention  that background
principles  not only can change  over time,  but can do so  retroac-
tively.  Once, therefore, a land use regulation is deemed to reflect
"common,  shared  understandings  of permissible  limitations  de-
rived  from  a State's  legal tradition,"  background  principles  will
apply  to  all  landowners  regardless  of when  they may  have  ac-
quired their property:  "A regulation or  common law  rule cannot
be a background principle for  some owners, but not for others." 6 7
The import of Justice  Kennedy's opinion for the Court, espe-
cially  when  combined  with  the  concurring  opinion  of  Justice
O'Connor  and  the  four dissenting  Justices  is  that  the  Court  is
likely  to  fall back  more  on  the  kind of multi-factored  balancing
tests of reasonableness in its taking analysis, akin to that Justice
Brennan  set forth in his  opinion for the  Court in Penn Central,
and  away  from  the  Lucas per se  approach.  Justice  Kennedy's
opinion for the Palazzolo Court repeatedly emphasizes  the essen-
tial touchstone  of "reasonableness" just as  he did in his separate
concurring opinion in Lucas.  And, Justice  O'Connor's concurring
opinion makes  even more explicit her view  of the continuing via-
65.  Id. at 1035.
66.  Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629.
67.  Id. at 630.
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bility  of the  Penn Central takings  analysis  and  its  balancing
approach.
68
III.  The Court's Future Docket
There  is  currently  only  one  significant  environmental  case
pending before the Court.  The day after the Court decided Palaz-
zolo, the  Court  showed  that its  appetite  for regulatory  takings
claim remained whetted by granting review in yet another case.69
There  are  also  several  major  constitutional  controversies  that
seemed destined for the Court's review in the near term.  Indeed,
to  a certain  extent, that Court has  essentially invited the  lower
courts to explore the issues, with the apparent purpose of estab-
lishing  a  lower  court  record  for  the  Court's  review  in  a  future
proceeding.
In Tahoe-Sierra  Preservation  Council v.  Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency, 70  landowners  appear  to  have reached  the limits  of
the Court's willingness to protect private property rights.  The up-
shot may  well  be the first unconditional  victory  for  government
regulators in an environmental takings case  since Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis in 1987.71  The landown-
ers argue  in Tahoe-Sierra that a temporary  moratorium on land
use development constitutes  a per se taking under Lucas because
the  landowner  is  deprived  of  all  "use"  of  the  property  during
the time  in which the  moratorium is  effective.  This per se  rule
applies,  they argue, regardless of the moratorium's duration, geo-
graphic scope,  economic impact,  or its interference with reasona-
ble  investment-backed  expectations. 72   In  the  aftermath  of
Palazzolo, however,  little  doubt remains  that  a  majority  of the
Justices are now ready to reject such an extreme per se approach
to regulatory takings  analysis.
For that  same  reason, however,  government  regulators  and
environmentalists have reason for concern that Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor may, as part of their shift towards balancing tests
and less  absolutist positions, be  ready to revisit the "parcel  as a
whole" touchstone  that has  proved  so important to those defend-
ing government regulations challenged as a regulatory taking.  In
68.  Id. at 632.
69.  Tahoe-Sierra  Preservation  Council  v. Tahoe  Regional  Planning Agency,  533
U.S.  948 (2001).
70.  216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000).
71.  480 U.S. 470 (1987).
72.  Petitioner's Brief at 45, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council (No.  00-1167).
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Penn Central, the  Court ruled that  a takings inquiry  considered
the "parcel  as a  whole" and not just that  smaller portion  of the
property most restricted in deciding whether a land use regulation
amounts  to  a  taking  requiring  the  payment  of just  compensa-
tion.73  Because most land use restrictions do not restrict an entire
parcel, the practical effect  of the "parcel  as a whole" analysis can
be to  make it  far more difficult for landowners  to prevail.
Justice Kennedy's  opinion for the Court in Palazzolo suggests
that there are several Justices who are interested in revisiting the
"parcel  as a  whole" test and  who  are  questioning  its  propriety.
The Court's  opinion  formally  declined  "to examine the persisting
question of what is  the proper denominator in  the takings frac-
tion," but only because Mr. Palazzolo did not properly present the
issue in the courts below or in his petition for a writ of certiorari. 74
But the Court expressly noted that "at times" the Court "has ex-
pressed discomfort with the logic of the rule," citing University  of
Chicago  law  professor  Richard  Epstein, 75  who  promotes  an  ag-
gressive application of the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation
Clause to governmental  regulation. 76
The  Court's invitation is clear.  A majority of the Court may
be ready to revisit the Penn Central holding and is inviting liti-
gants to raise and brief the issue in future cases.  It  seems likely,
moreover,  that at  least  the two  "swing" Justices,  Kennedy  and
O'Connor,  will ultimately  favor  a  more nuanced,  contextual  ap-
proach to defining the property that rejects automatically defining
the relevant property either in its broadest or narrowest possible
terms.
77
Another major constitutional issue likely to be on the Court's
docket in the near future is whether the Endangered  Species Act
(ESA) Section  9's application  to habitat modification  falls within
Congress's Commerce Clause authority.78  In SWANCC, the Court
could  avoid  the  constitutional  issue  by  interpreting  the  "plain
73.  438 U.S. at 130-31.
74.  533 U.S.  at 631 (emphasis added).
75.  Id. (emphasis added).
76.  RICHARD ALLEN  EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  PRIVATE  PROPERTY AND  THE  POWER OF EMI-
NENT  DOMAIN  (1985).
77.  The  Court  decided  the Tahoe-Sierra case  since  this essay went  to press  in
March.  See 122 S.  Ct. 1465 (2002).  By a six to three vote, Justice Stevens' opinion for
the Court did, as predicted, narrow the applicability of  Lucas and expand the applica-
bility of Penn Central. The Court's reasoning, however, also reaffirmed the "parcel  as
a whole" approach.  The result was  a major win for environmental regulators.
78.  16 U.S.C.  § 1538  (2002).
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meaning" of "navigable waters."  In an ESA Section  9 case, how-
ever,  the Court will  not be  able to  similarly  avoid  the  constitu-
tional issue because the Court has already upheld the Department
of  the  Interior's  regulatory  construction  of the  statutory  term
"take" to extend to modification of habitat that actually harms the
species. 79  To date, two courts of appeals (the D.C. Circuit and the
Fourth Circuit) have upheld  the constitutionality  of the statute,
but both times  over  loud dissents.80  In the  absence  of a  circuit
conflict,  the  Supreme  Court  denied  certiorari  on  each  of those
prior occasions.
Although  it  seems,  therefore,  unlikely that the Court  would
agree to hear the issue in the absence of a circuit conflict, there is
reason to believe that such a conflict may soon be presented by one
of a host of cases pending in the lower courts.  The case with the
most immediate potential to provide a candidate for Court review,
Shields v.  Norton, is now  pending  before  a  reportedly  skeptical
Fifth Circuit.  If that appellate court rules against the federal gov-
ernment  on Commerce  Clause grounds,  the Supreme  Court  will
have little choice but to grant a Solicitor General's request for fur-
ther review.
8'
Whenever  it  is  finally  presented  to  the Court,  the  question
whether  ESA  Section  9  passes  constitutional  muster  will  chal-
lenge the Court's commitment to the analytical framework that it
has  adopted  and  pursued  in  its  recent  precedent.  The  ESA's
structure and jurisdictional touchstones do not neatly fit that new
framework, which focuses in the first instance on whether the ac-
tivities being regulated are  sufficiently "economic" in character.8 2
The dilemma for the Court is that, notwithstanding the awkward-
ness of that misfit, the ESA is the very kind of legislation that is
necessarily national in its purpose and reach.8 3
79.  Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S.
687 (1995).
80.  Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 506 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); National Ass'n of
Home  Builders v. Babbitt,  130  F.3d 1041,  1060  (1997) (Luttig, J., dissenting).
81.  This  case was  on appeal  at the time this  essay went to press, but has since
been decided.  See Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2002).  The Court did not
reach the merits because  it dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
82.  See Lopez, 514 U.S.  549; Morrison,  529  U.S. 598.
83.  The same could not be readily said of the federal laws at issue in either Lopez
or Morrison. And, although  many believe that it was true of the federal dredge  and
fill  permitting program  contested  in SWANCC,  the procedural  posture  of that case
masked the federal character of the program before the Justices.  Because the State of
Illinois,  unlike most states, has a comprehensive permitting program that applied to
the proposed dredging  and filling activity at issue in SWANCC, the Court  may well
17PACE ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW REVIEW
Whether the Court is willing  to recognize  the constitutional
propriety of allowing Congress to address these kinds of environ-
mental and natural resource issues may well turn on its apprecia-
tion  of  what  is  "environmental"  about  environmental  law.  It
should be sufficient to sustain national legislation that protection
and maintenance  of the nation's natural  resource  base  is funda-
mental to any viable  economy.  No greater commercial  motive  or
nexus  should  be  necessary.  As  explained  by  another  Garrison
Lecturer,  Professor Joseph Sax,  albeit in another context,  it  will
require the Justices to appreciate the "economy of nature" as well
as respond to the current  "market economy."8 4
There is reason for defenders  of the ESA to be hopeful in this
regard.  Justice  O'Connor joined  Justice  Blackmun's  dissent  in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, which faulted Justice Scalia's opin-
ion for the  Court  for engaging  in  a  "slash and burn  expedition"
through the environmental  law of standing.85  And, Justice Ken-
nedy declined to join part of the majority rationale and wrote sep-
arately about the need for broader  Congressional  authority than
contemplated  by the majority opinion.8 6  Even more importantly,
perhaps, was the Fourth Circuit opinion upholding the ESA's con-
stitutionality in Gibbs v.  Babbitt, 7 which was  authored by  Chief
Judge  Wilkinson.  Chief Judge  Wilkinson  is  a  highly-regarded
moderate conservative jurist and is more likely to foreshadow the
views of O'Connor and Kennedy than Judge Luttig who dissented
in that case.88
Finally, Justice  Kennedy's  overlooked  concurring  opinion  in
Laidlaw strongly  suggests  a  potential  third  round  of constitu-
tional  litigation  on the Court's docket in the near future.  While
joining Justice Ginsburg's opinion  for the Court in Laidlaw, Ken-
nedy separately wrote that '[d]ifficult  and fundamental questions
are raised when  we ask whether  exactions of public fines by pri-
vate litigants,  and the delegation of Executive  power which might
be inferable from the authorization, are permissible  in view of the
responsibilities  committed  to  the  Executive  by Article  II  of the
have been left with the impression that the federal  Section 404 permit requirements
were merely  duplicative of the state program.
84.  Joseph  L.  Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN.  L. REV.  1433 (1993).
85.  504 U.S. at  606 (Blackmun, J. dissenting with O'Connor, J., joining).
86.  Id.  at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
87.  214 F.3d 483.
88.  Id.  at 506  (dissenting opinion).
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Constitution  of the United  States." 8 9  Justice  Kennedy, in  short,
questioned the constitutionality of environmental citizen  suit en-
forcement under Article II as currently provided for in most every
federal environmental  law.
There  are  three  potentially  pertinent  clauses  in Article  II.
These include the Appointments Clause (§ 2,  cl. 2), Vesting Clause
(§  1, cl.  1),  and the Take  Care  Clause  (§ 3,  cl.  4).  The Appoint-
ments  Clause provides exclusive authority in the President to ap-
point  officers  of the United  States,  subject  to  Senate  confirma-
tion.90  The  Vesting  Clause  provides  that "the Executive  Power
shall be vested in the President;"91 and the Take Care Clause pro-
vides simply that the President shall "take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed."
92
The gist of Kennedy's suggestion is that allowing environmen-
tal  suits  for  civil  penalties  payable  to  the  federal  Treasury
amounts  to an impermissible  Congressional  delegation  of Execu-
tive branch authority to private  citizens in violation  of Article II.
Kennedy's statement has breathed life into the issue in the lower
courts because the regulated community is well aware  of the piv-
otal role the Justice plays in the Court's decision-making in envi-
ronmental  cases.  The  issue  is  currently  pending  in two federal
courts of appeals and one federal district court in North Carolina.
The Fifth Circuit case is Shields v. Norton,93 the same case previ-
ously described  as raising the question  of whether  Congress has
exceeded  its  Commerce  Clause  authority in section  9  of the  En-
dangered Species Act.  In the cases pending before the Eighth Cir-
cuit and in North Carolina, Mississippi  River Revival v.  City of St.
Paul94 and North Carolina  Shellfish Growers Association v. North
Carolina Coastal Federation, 95  defendants  have  each raised  the
constitutional  defense in resisting a Clean Water Act citizen suit.
Here too it is no coincidence that this latest constitutional is-
sue arises in an environmental case.  The nature of the ecological
problem to be addressed is what prompted Congress to include cit-
izen suit provisions.  The vast number of activities subject to envi-
89.  528 U.S. at 197 (Kennedy,  J., concurring).
90.  U.S.  CONST.  art. II, § 2,  cl.  2.
91.  U.S.  CONST. art. II, § 1,  cl.  1.
92.  U.S.  CONST. art. II, § 3,  cl.  4.
93.  No. 00-50839, on appeal, (5th Cir. 2002).  As described  in note 81, supra, the
Fifth Circuit has  since dismissed this  case  for lack  of jurisdiction without reaching
this issue.  See 289 F.3d 832.
94.  No.  01-2511,  on appeal, (8th Cir.).
95.  No.  7:01-CV-36-BO(1)  (E.D.N.C.)
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ronmental  protection  requirements  makes  it  impossible  for the
government  to  rely  solely  on  its  own  limited  enforcement  re-
sources.  In  addition,  the  schizophrenic  nature  of government's
role in environmental protection-as  both regulator and the regu-
lated-renders  it  all the more  important to have  a citizen  over-
seer.  Having the penalties  payable to the Treasury is a sensible
safeguard to ensure against the unjust enrichment of private citi-
zens  to  the  detriment  of the  public  fisc.  Ironically,  however,  it
may well be that same safeguard that is the nub of Justice  Ken-
nedy's  suggestion of a possible  constitutional infirmity.
Conclusion
Environmental  law  will  continue,  as  it  has  in  the  past, to
raise  difficult  questions  of federal  constitutional  law.  Some  of
these will be rooted in the peculiar way in which the concerns ad-
dressed  by environmental  law challenge  our nation's lawmaking
institutions and processes.  Others are even more fundamental in
nature because they relate to possible differences in priorities and
substantive  values  between  environmental  law  and  those  re-
flected in certain constitutional guarantees.  The Court's ability to
address both kinds of issues will ultimately turn on the extent to
which  the Justices  appreciate  the  "environmental" dimension  to
the legal issue they face.
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APPENDIX B
Environmental  Cases Decided  by the
United States Supreme  Court
October Term 1999-October  Term 2000
By Justice-Environmental  Protection Scores
EP Ratio  EP Score
Justice  (# EP votes/EP cases)  (EP Ratio x  100)
Breyer  6/6  100
Ginsburg  6/6  100
Kennedy  4/6  66.7
O'Connor  4/6  66.7
Rehnquist  4/6  66.7
Scalia  3/6  50
Souter  6/6  100
Stevens  6/6  100
Thomas  3/6  50
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